

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT ROUTING SLIP

TO:

		ACTION	INFO	DATE	INITIAL
1	DCI		X w/o att		
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3	EXDIR				
4	D/ICS				
5	DDI				
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8	DDS&T				
9	Chm/NIC				
10	GC				
11	IG				
12	Compt				
13	D/Pers				
14	D/OLL				
15	D/PAO				
16	SA/IA				
17	AO/DCI				
18	C/IPD/OIS				
19	C/SECOM	X w/att			
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SUSPENSE

Date

Remarks

cc - memo sent

6/11/84 m.

D/ Executive Secretary
8 June 84

Date

3637 (10-81)

Executive Registry

84 - 2557

8 June 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, Security Committee
FROM: Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT: Unauthorized Disclosures and Prepublication Review

I was interested in reading the report to you on damage sustained through uncleared publications. I return it with the thought that some reference to this phase of the problem might be made in the broader paper that I requested in another memorandum to you of today's date.



William J. Casey

DCI
EXEC
REG

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SECRET

DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

Security Committee

6 June 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Kenneth deGraffenreid
National Security Council Staff

25X1 FROM:

[REDACTED]
Chairman

25X1 SUBJECT: Unauthorized Disclosures and Prepublication Review [REDACTED]

REFERENCE: SECOM-D-029, 13 February 1984, same subject

25X1 1. Reference transmitted to you a report by the CIA Prepublication Review Board (PRB) concerning the effectiveness of PRB in preventing the inadvertent publication of classified information. It also mentioned the efforts of a task force to determine how many unreviewed publications by SCI-approved individuals contained classified information. That group has now completed its efforts and its report is attached. [REDACTED]

25X1 2. Particularly noteworthy in the attachment is the conclusion that prepublication review is indispensable as a means of averting unintended disclosures, but is not a significant factor in preventing willful disclosures of classified information, or "leaks." I hope this material will be of assistance to you. [REDACTED]

25X1 Attachment:

25X1 [REDACTED]
Copy 9 of 13

25X1 Regrade CONFIDENTIAL When Separated
From SCI Attachment and When SCI
Caveats are Physically Removed

CL BY SIGNER
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25X1 6 June 1984

25X1 Prepared by: C/SECOM

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16 MAY 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, SECOM

FROM:

Director of Information Services, DA

SUBJECT:

Results of Task Force Effort to Support
Prepublication Review Element of NSDD-84

1. To develop support for the prepublication review requirement in NSDD-84, a task force was created to review the writings of former government officials with access to SCI who had published writings not submitted for prepublication review. The Task Force was to look for classified information that had been disclosed because there was no prepublication review requirement. This was not considered to be a search for leaks, and for more on that point see paragraph 5c below. The Task Force was organized under the Office of Information Services (OIS), Directorate of Administration with additional support provided by the Directorates of Operations, Intelligence, and Science and Technology, and by the Office of Security. The Task Force was provided with a list, compiled by the National Security Council, of 536 writings published by former Government officials without the benefit of prepublication review. These included books, monographs, and articles in newspapers and journals. Before the Task Force could review all of this material and complete its work, the project was overtaken by events when implementation of NSDD-84 was suspended. This report of the Task Force results is being submitted for the record.

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they discuss. This gives great veracity to their words and worsens the damage that they can cause. It is this kind of constant hemorrhaging of our sensitive information bit by bit that feeds the perception already held by many, and that number is being added to every day, that the U.S. Government is unable to keep secrets and could be dangerous to work with where confidence and discretion are critical.

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5. Conclusions, based on the assumption that this was a representative sampling of published writings not submitted for prepublication review, were:

a. The amount of sensitive information that can be considered classified and compromised is extremely small.

b. The classified information appears in books and the more detailed articles that appear in journals rather than in articles that appear in the press.

c. We do not consider the classified information that we uncovered during this project to represent leaks, and we believe that the consideration of leaks should be kept entirely separate from the matter of prepublication review. Prepublication review concerns writings from known authors who, as CIA experience has shown, are generally agreeable to submitting their material before it is published and deleting sensitive material from it when requested to do so. This person is telling a story or offering judgments and opinions. The leaker is anonymous and reveals facts intended to achieve a specific and usually immediate objective. To lump the two groups together is to do a gross disservice to the legitimate author.

d. The persons revealing the classified information formerly held very high positions in the executive branch. These are the persons that one would normally expect to be models of discretion. Thus, it appears that if we require prepublication review it must cover everybody.

e. Do the results of this project support the argument for having prepublication review as proposed in NSDD-84? We believe that they do because so little information would have to be deleted. This means that reviews could be done quickly (they averaged 22 days in CIA in 1983); authors would be required to delete very little material from their manuscripts (almost 67 percent of the manuscripts submitted to CIA had nothing deleted in 1983, manuscripts on non-intelligence matters should have even less), and the requirement for prepublication review would send a message to the world at large that the executive branch is working to protect its secrets.

f. Should prepublication review be left voluntary? Experience has shown that the great majority of former officials will not write things that they believe are classified. As noted above, there is an occasional author who refuses to submit his manuscript for review. To handle that situation, there must be a way to penalize such persons

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when they publish classified information; otherwise, the system is meaningless. Whether they submit or not, authors can and do make mistakes in their judgment, and admittedly, much of the decision making in classification questions is subjective. It must be recognized that those still serving in the Government have the most current understanding of what has to be kept secret. They also are responsible to keep the secrets, and therefore are the only legitimate authority to declassify information. If they are to be mistrusted in that work, can former officials be trusted to write only unclassified information?

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DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

Security Committee

6 June 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director, Intelligence Community Staff

FROM: [REDACTED]

Chairman

SUBJECT: Prepublication Review Project Report [REDACTED]

1. Attached is a "for the record" report by the Director of Information Services, CIA regarding the review of almost 500 publications in an effort to assist the NSC Staff in establishing a nexus between the absence of prepublication review requirements and unauthorized disclosures. In the midst of the project, the NSC Staff agreed to shift the effort to a survey of the number of disclosures which were averted through prepublication review. This latter effort was reported to Mr. deGraffenreid by SECOM-D-029 dated 13 February 1984. [REDACTED]

2. Most of the disclosures uncovered by the OIS/CIA task force, while damaging, could not be considered disastrous. The most important conclusions in [REDACTED] report appear in subparagraphs 5c and 5d. These essentially say that prepublication review has little to do with leaks, per se, and that prepublication review is a valuable way to prevent inadvertent disclosures, if it is uniformly applied at all levels. The conclusion in 5c is most important, because it recognizes that leakers will not be deterred by prepublication review agreements. The leaker is never identified by the publisher and leaking is a covert activity in the truest sense--it is not attributable. [REDACTED]

3. The primary lesson to be learned from the report is that, while we should continue to support prepublication review, we cannot consider it a way to deter or detect the perpetrators of unauthorized disclosures of classified intelligence. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
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

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4. The report is furnished for your information. Also attached is a copy of a memorandum transmitting the OIS report to Mr. de Graffenreid, at whose request the review was begun.  

Attachment:

- A. Report from D/IS
- B. Memo to DeGraffenreid

cc: C/Publications Review Board, CIA, w/atts
C/UDIS/SECOM, w/atts
CIA Member, SECOM, w/atts
D/Information Services, CIA, w/att B & A

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[redacted], 6 June 1984

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Prepared by: C/SECOM [redacted]

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